Case studiesSatellites[PLACEHOLDER]
A LEO constellation added archive-grade provenance to ground-mediated link authentication.
Inter-satellite link authentication events now produce independently verifiable records that survive operator boundaries and crypto migrations.
Outcome: Per-link provenance shippable on ground contact. Multi-year mission archive verifiable independent of operator key-management changes.
[PLACEHOLDER CASE STUDY] [CUSTOMER NAME] operates a [LEO constellation of N satellites] providing [SERVICE]. The constellation authenticates inter-satellite links via [GROUND-MEDIATED KEY-MANAGEMENT SCHEME] running alongside CCSDS SDLS at the data link and IETF BPSec at the bundle layer. Those primitives verify each message on receipt — but the cryptographic evidence is consumed at that point, and what survives in the mission archive is a regular database record inside the operator's trust boundary. For multi-tenant operations and for long-archive obligations, that is not independently verifiable by parties outside the operator trust circle.
EdSSA Orbit was deployed alongside the existing stack — not as a replacement. The operator's ground-mediated KMS continues to operate. SDLS and BPSec continue to verify each transit on receipt. In addition, every inter-satellite link authentication event now produces an EdSSA provenance record: anchored, replay-checked, post-quantum-ready (ML-KEM-768 + threshold), and independently verifiable by any party holding the artifact and the open EdSSA spec. State advancement is coupled to physical events the satellite observes locally (perigee passage, eclipse exit, ground-station acquisition), so the record stream stays continuous across multi-orbit gaps.
Across [N] consecutive orbits during [TIME WINDOW], every inter-satellite link authentication event produced a corresponding EdSSA provenance record, shipped to the mission archive on next ground contact. A subsequent payload-tenant audit verified the record stream independently of the operator's internal logs — a property the SDLS / BPSec verification path alone could not provide.
The operator now offers payload tenants and end customers verifiable mission-archive provenance as a standard contractual term. The archive remains verifiable across the operator's scheduled post-quantum key-management migration, independent of which underlying primitives the ground KMS runs at any given epoch.