The problem
What today's M2M auth can't deliver in critical infrastructure.
Operators of power generation and distribution, water treatment and distribution, gas pipelines, and telecommunications backbone face two converging pressures: regulatory mandates for post-quantum migration on long-lived equipment, and threat models that include nation-state-level adversaries with multi-year reconnaissance horizons. Centralised PKI under foreign jurisdiction is not a politically tenable foundation.
How EdSSA addresses it
What EdSSA does differently here.
EdSSA Nano is sovereign by design — built in Helsinki, NIST and ETSI primitives only, no dependency on US-controlled key infrastructure. Operations can run air-gapped after bootstrap; verification is auditable; the post-quantum story is intrinsic to the architecture, not a roadmap.
Use cases
Concrete operational scenarios.
- Substation-to-control-centre authentication on air-gappable links
- Inter-utility coordination authentication across regulatory boundaries
- Telecommunications backbone equipment authentication
- Water-treatment SCADA authentication with sovereign-clean cryptographic primitives
Compliance & standards
Standards and regulatory regimes.
EU NIS2 and CER directives. EU Cyber Resilience Act. IEC 62443. NERC CIP at architectural level. ENISA guidance.
Audit emission
Per-control-action audit logging aligned with NIS2 incident-reporting requirements and IEC 62443 SL-3/SL-4 zone-and-conduit logging. Optional tamper-evident anchoring for post-incident forensics.
Customers
Operators in this vertical.
“Air-gappable, sovereign-clean, post-quantum from day one. Three boxes ticked in one architecture.”